BGU | MY PATH, Haim Doron, MD

As I already noted, there were two kinds of doctors: Those who were in favor of striking the health system and those who were interested in ending the strike as fast as possible. With the latter I could engage in negotiation. The strike began in the midst of the period when I was engaged in an all- out effort to vitalize family medicine. Therefore, I had a very close partnership with doctors at the clinics, particularly with their chair, Dr. Miriam Tzangen, who was very dedicated to the principles of primary care medicine. Most of the clinic doctors who participated in the strike did so as if whipped into doing so. They were the strike’s primary injured parties, since, if a patient had to pay 600 NIS for a doctor’s visit, people preferred to go to a hospital doctor. Thus, the doctors at the clinics were the ones losing wages. I conducted negotiations in coordination with the director-general of the Ministry of Health, Prof. Baruch Modan, because I knew if I would go over one of the government’s “red lines,” they would surely reject the agreement. Of course, in conducting negotiations with the doctors in the community I had no intention to do damage to the IMA or the hospital doctors. I fought to end the closure of the clinics, and was not in any way, shape, or form, fighting the hospital doctors. Just the opposite. I was interested in improving their wages through compensation by the government. One should not forget that at that time, Clalit had 14 hospitals. The crux of the agreement I achieved with the clinic physicians was as follows: A marked improvement in wages; improvement of working conditions of doctors in the clinics; and progress in vitalization of family medicine. Dr. Miriam Tzangen, as chair of Clalit Physicians Association, wasn’t compelled to bring the agreement for approval of the IMA because there had never been such a thing in past negotiations. But she was straight as an arrow; and she did not want the agreement to appear in any way as a stab in the back to the hospital doctors. In a small forum of the IMA’s leaders, the agreement squeaked by, by a margin of one vote; and in a broader forum, it failed to pass. This was not because they objected to the agreement itself, but rather out of fear it would undermine the struggle and the negotiations with the hospital doctors. In the meantime, the clinics remained closed. It should be kept in mind that after the strike, all of the sectors of the IMA voted unanimously in favor of Dr. Miram Tzangen chairing the organization. In other words, I fought almost single-handedly against this strike. The Labor Federation took a neutral stand vis-à-vis the strike, in a best-case scenario, taking no part in events. 156 After a time, the Labor Federation’s secretary convened a meeting with the most militant doctors, as if to signal that it was Clalit that should have made accommodations with them. The doctors who wanted a swift end to the strike because they were pained by the damage it was rendering to public medicine, chose to declare a hunger strike. It was not coincidental that the hunger strike broke out in Beer Sheva where we established a school of medicine infused with the spirit of community medicine and dedication to the health needs of the public-at-large. In fact, the hospital doctors in Beer Sheva demanded the strike be ended quickly in the interest of public medicine. Out of the blue, the Labor Federation secretary at the time, Yeruham Meshel, convinced me to visit the hunger strikers in Beer Sheva. This meeting was rife with a sense of deep anguish and tremendous sorrow. When things became too much, Prof. Mordechai Shani, director of the Sheba Medical Center, and I, went to Jerusalem to meet with Prime Minister Menachem Begin. It was evident that Begin found it hard to hear us, but made a great effort to listen; and the meeting had a positive effect. I don’t know if it was because the two of us appeared together 157 or some other reason. Whatever was the case, together, we convinced him that from a medical standpoint the strike 156 Doron, by mentioning “best case scenario” seems to be alluding to what worried him if the Labor Federation got involved, namely, that the Federation would have exploited the strike as part of the political opposition to Menachem Begin’s government and the Likud Party. In contrast, Doron’s concerns were what he believed to be in the best interests of an enlightened public health system. 157 Doron and Shani represented rival camps of government doctors and Clalit doctors that had joined ranks for this meeting.

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